This paper argues that institutions and political party systems are simultaneously determined. A large change to the institutional framework, such as the creation of the euro by a group of European countries, will realign -after a transition period-the party system as well. The new political landscape may not be compatible with the institutions that triggered it. To illustrate this point, we study the case of the euro and how the party system has evolved in Southern and Northern European countries in response to it.
general reshuffling of the "economic cards" is, for them, a more attractive policy. At the heart of the division between different constituencies lies divergent assessments of the risks that each policy alternative represents. Furthermore, these changes have anchored themselves within les lieux de mémoire created by old historical turning points that seem to have been buried in these countries (such as the discussion regarding the constitutional design of postwar Europe, how to come to terms with the inheritance of past civil wars, and the policy choices that the left has made over the preceding decades).
A similar process, but from the center-right pole, has occurred in several Northern European countries. Here fractures run along different dimensions. A first source of tension is the realization that the sustainability of the euro may require some form of fiscal union and an ever deeper mutualization of risks. This splits traditional center-right constituencies into two groups: those who benefit from exchange-rate stability and a depreciated currency (anyone linked to the export sector) and those who might bear the tax burden associated with transfers inside the monetary union without being linked to the export sector, such as anyone associated with the local services economy. The first group is willing to consider deeper ties to preserve the monetary union from which they benefit, whereas the second -though wary of the costs of undoing the euro-want to bound and put a limit on fiscal integration, such as any form of eurobonds or a system of deposit insurance at the European level to complete the banking union. An additional divide, but one closely connected to trade, relates to immigration. A consequence of the freedom of movement of people at the heart of the European Union has been a significant intra-European flow of workers. These flows open a new divide between those who benefit from the cheap-labor immigrants typically supply and those whose wages are potentially hurt by increased labor market competition. Technological progress adds to the woes of those exposed to these trends. Cultural displacement is an additional factor that cuts across political divides.
Note that immigration is a European Union concern (since this is the jurisdiction where the "four freedoms" of movement of goods, services, capital and people operate) and not just a Eurozone problem. Thus even in countries such as the United Kingdom that stayed outside the euro, the consequences of European integration have been a determining factor (although not the only one) in the outcome of the recent Brexit referendum.
In this paper, we will describe these forces and offer tentative arguments about how to analyze them. Of course, we are aware that other mechanisms were important in the political changes witnessed in Europe over the last few years. The historical cleavages of working class allegiance and religious identity that solidified, respectively, the electoral bases of social democrat and Christian democrat parties have been significantly eroded by technological change, structural transformation, and by the broad secularization of European societies. And, as proved by the success of Podemos in Spain, social media allow the electoral breakthrough of novel parties with limited budgets by letting their message reach voters without the mediation of traditional "gatekeepers." Finally, as briefly mentioned above, immigration has been central to the success of right-wing populist parties. Nevertheless, we find that the unheralded role of the euro has been crucial in catalyzing many of the previous forces.
We start now to develop the previous arguments in more detail by describing how Western European postwar politics was organized.
2 The connections of the DNVP with the social, economic, and military elites of Germany -best represented by Alfred Hugenberg, the party's leader and a media tycoon-gave the DNVP a weight that reached beyond the arithmetic of its electoral base. See Hertzman (1963) for a classic treatment of the origins and evolution of the DNVP and Beck (2008) for how the national conservatives aligned themselves with the NSDAP in 1933.
(Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI ), the largest in Western Europe, never entered into government even when it gained 34.37 percent of the votes in the general election of 1976. (Milward, 2000) .
Of the three political families, the Christian democrats were the electorally most successful one, especially until the early 1980s. The most extreme case was Italy, where the Democrazia Cristiana ruled (alone or in coalition) uninterrupted from 1944 to 1994. Christian democrats governed West Germany from 1949 to 1969 (alone or in coalition, the last three years with the social democrats) and again from 1982 to 1998 (again, in coalition). Social democrats made inroads into power in the late 1960s and 1970s as younger voters were attracted by the promises of more redistribution and progressive social policies. The liberal parties, in comparison, could never extend their reach beyond the upper-middle and professional classes.
The political-economic consensus was supported by internal and external forces. Among the internal forces, the most relevant was economic growth. The trente glorieuses (1945-1975) saw per capita income growth rates between 3 and over 5 percent across Europe even after controlling for recovery from the war. Voters were satisfied with peace, prosperity, low unemployment, and increasingly generous social transfers. The electoral systems were often designed to favor mainstream parties (for example, in Germany, with high threshold requirements to obtain par-liamentary representation or, as we already mentioned, by judicial decisions declaring radical parties to be illegal). Finally, these were the decades of old-style media: there were limited TV and radio networks (and, in contrast with the U.S., most of them were government-owned), traditional newspapers, and no internet. 5 Dissenting voices were easy to marginalize in the public debate. Among the external forces, the gentle nudging from the U.S., the Soviet menace (ruthlessly exploited by Christian democrats in Germany and Italy), and, above all, the memory of World War II turned many voters into cautious decision makers that favored centrist, consensus-oriented politicians.
The democratization wave of the 1970s
Three countries in Southern Europe had resisted the consensus described in the previous paragraphs: Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Spain and Portugal had right-wing dictatorships for decades (from 1926 to 1974 in Portugal, from 1936 to 1975 shift towards competitive disinflation" (Clift, 2002, p. 325) . 10 This turnaround explains why politicians as radically different as Mitterrand and Thatcher could agree on a project of the magnitude of the SEA, which was to be spearheaded, as already mentioned, by Jacques Delors, the same man who had convinced the French president of the wisdom of reversing policies.
Mitterrand's about-face had momentous political consequences for " [t] here was nothing like a converted left government to destabilize the labour movement" (Moss, 1998, p. 235 In sum, the failed policy experiments of the 1970s, the inevitable consequence of the lack of coordination across countries participating in the EMS, led to an embrace of policies that emphasized structural reforms and supply-side policies. That such ideas were gaining credence among academic economists was more a convenient rationalization than a cause (see, for another assessment, McNamara 1998).
That exchange-rate policies have redistributive consequences and lead to political realignments has long been recognized. But our point is not just that the Eurozone crisis is simply a more extreme version of the political realignment of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Rather, we argue, as well, that the creation of the euro was the recognition that fixed exchange-rate regimes of the EMS imposed constraints on the set of feasible policies, but that the EMS lacked commitment devices to enforce these constraints. European governments could always fall into the temptation of a devaluation to avoid the unpleasant short-term sacrifices imposed by the supply-side reforms needed to render national economies more flexible, the EMS sustainable in the long run, and the single market a reality. Policy U-turns notwithstanding, the EMS in the 1980s saw several devaluations leading to the complete breakdown of the system in the early 1990s. A full monetary union was the logical conclusion to the intellectual progress of the European establishment and the lack of commitment devices in the design of the EMS.
5 From the SEA to the euro
Monetary union had been a topic of discussion in the EEC since the Werner report in 1969. This was part of a process of constantly thinking about the optimal global monetary arrangements among increasingly integrated European economies. The history of this process is absorbing and reflects both political and conceptual developments. We do not need to summarize this process here (James, 2012, is an excellent review of the historical events and the ideological motivations of the European monetary unification). For our purposes, it is more important to focus on the political-economy effects the euro was supposed to have, both in the core and on the periphery of Europe.
In the core, the euro would anchor, once and for all, a rule-based approach to monetary and fiscal policy as defined by the Maastricht Treaty and to isolate the project of European integration from the vagaries of financial turbulences.
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On the periphery, the expected changes were more profound. Traditionally, Southern European countries responded to economic crises through devaluations, either by choice or forced by the financial markets. By playing with their exchange rate, these countries could increase their exports and lower their imports, rebalancing their current account. These improvements came at a cost: real wages fell (imported goods and services were more expensive) and borrowers in foreign currency were left with a higher real burden. But the more favorable trade balance increased employment and output and improved the fiscal situation. Devaluations were a crude and painful, yet effective, stabilization tool, at least in the short run.
Critics of these devaluations pointed out that few of the structural problems of the economies were solved by variations in the exchange rates. Rapid inflation quickly erased the relative price advantages delivered by devaluation, and profligate public sectors spent all the additional tax 11 Although how these rules would be interpreted in practice was either ambiguous or conceptualized in different ways by the Germans and the French; see Brunnermeier, James, and Landau (2016) on how these views were informed by the historical experience of each country.
revenue. After a few years, the Southern European economies were back to square one. The euro was the silver bullet to break this vicious cycle, the commitment device that would deliver on the promise of the EMS and would justify the turnaround by the European left. Without the "easy way out" of devaluations, Southern European countries would finally address the reforms in their goods and labor markets they had been postponing for decades. The political and economic elites hoped that the euro would transform Southern European economies into versions of their Northern neighbors, but, as the joke went, with better food and weather. 1993M05 1993M09 1994M01 1994M05 1994M09 1995M01 1995M05 1995M09 1996M01 1996M05 1996M09 1997M01 1997M05 1997M09 1998M01 1998M05 1998M09 1999M01 1999M05 1999M09 To nearly everyone's surprise (including academics'), these positive developments did not materialize. Instead, the euro unleashed some perverse political-economic effects that had been largely absent from the public discussion. Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos (2013) describe this process in detail, but we can summarize the main lines of the argument here.
The euro brought a fast convergence of interest rates to German levels (see the by-now famous Figure 1 of the 10-year yields of several European countries' government bonds from 1993 to 2005). Countries such as Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, which had historically faced high interest rate spreads, suddenly had easy and cheap access to practically unlimited amounts of capital. Greece and Portugal used this capital to finance large increases in government debt.
Ireland and Spain used the funds to fuel an unprecedented real estate boom.
The abundance of capital triggered three mechanisms. The first mechanism was that cheap financing worsened the signal-extraction problem at the core of many relations in modern societies. Often, a principal (voters, shareholders, ...) must learn about the performance of an agent (a politician, CEOs, ...) in a dynamic context to evaluate the agent and to reward it (re-election of the politician, bonuses for a CEO, ...). The performance of the agent is difficult to evaluate both because it is subject to random shocks (even incompetent politicians can take, out of sheer luck, good decisions or profit from a favorable world economic environment) and because the agent can manipulate the information that the principal receives (a politician can play smoke-and-mirrors with the budget, postponing the accounting of expenses and frontloading revenues). The principal must, therefore, solve a complex signal-extraction problem.
This problem can become acute during a boom since it is hard to tell who is being successful due to skill and who due to widespread prosperity. 12 Furthermore, agents understand this problem and lower their effort: in a boom, even low-effort endeavors are successful. A crucial consequence of this aggravated principal-agent problem is that bad agents are not replaced and the quality of governance deteriorates.
The second mechanism was that a boom might change the distribution of relative political power in negative ways. Political power correlates, not perfectly but significantly, with economic power. Important industries can mobilize votes, donations, lobbying efforts (legal and illegal), prospects for future jobs, and public support for their favorite politicians and political agendas.
The clearest example of this phenomenon was during the real estate boom in Ireland and Spain.
In both countries, real estate developers became central actors in the political game, with an outsized influence in decision-making at different government levels. This increase in relative political power made it harder to steer these economies back to a more sustainable growth path before the boom burst and, when it did, to undertake decisive early action to counterbalance the fallout from the financial crisis.
The third mechanism was the ability of politicians to use the revenue triggered by the real estate boom or the capacity to borrow to finance a growing government consumption and generous social transfers. Many of these spending plans were not sustainable in the long run.
Those politicians more reluctant to engage in this "buying out of the electorate" were eased out of the elite-selection process and punished in elections. This generated a process of adverse selection, where the more capable or honest politicians were replaced by incompetent and often corrupt decision-makers.
A common feature of these three mechanisms is that they favored incumbents and, while the boom continued, limited the entry of new political contenders. The limitation on elite circulation prolonged the boom and blocked the recovery.
We will describe now how the fallout from the crisis has altered the political landscape across the euro area. 6 The party system and the euro
Southern Europe
The first years of the euro were an era of optimism. The pessimistic forecasts made by U.S.
economists that Europe was not an optimal currency area seemed to have been proven wrong (see, from many diverse ideological perspectives, Feldstein, 1997 , Friedman, 1997 , and Krugman, 1998 . Spain, Ireland, and Greece were booming (Portugal not so much) and even Germany, having cleared its fiscal house after unification, was growing again. The party systems of Together with the orthodox Communist Party of Greece (KKE ) and other minor groups, the radical left polled around 45 percent. The old-style socialist party, PASOK, collapsed to 6.28 percent and a neo-Nazi group, New Dawn (Chrysi Avyi), got 7.0 percent (all numbers are from the latest legislative election).
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What common patterns do we see in the evolution of the party system in these four Southern European Countries? First, the radical left has moved from a peripheral position to a much more 
Northern Europe
The evolution of the party systems in Northern European countries has been, except in France, less dramatic than in the south, although the landscape might change during the next couple of years. Political change follows its own calendar, deeply influenced by the election cycle.
In Germany, the biggest economy of the euro area, the 2013 German federal election yielded a conventional Bundestag. The Christian Democrats were only 5 seats short of a majority and the radical left of Die Linke were stuck at 8.6 percent. However, in 2016, Alternative for What common patterns do we see in the evolution of the party system of these Northern
European countries? Nearly the mirror image than the patterns we described in the previous section in Southern Europe.
First, there has been no improvement in the situation of the radical left, except partially in Matters related to exchange rate and price stability are always about redistributive policies.
The welfare state of the Southern European countries, with their generous benefits, has created a 15 In several of these countries, there are successful green parties (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in Germany, Groen Links in the Netherlands, De Vlaamse Groenen andÉcologistes in Belgium, Die Grünen in Austria, and Vihreä Liitto in Finland). But we are far from the days in the early 1980s where green parties challenged the establishment. Nowadays, green parties are the electoral vehicle of highly educated, progressive urban middle classes with rather limited revolutionary aspirations. 16 We will discuss the case of the Flemish Christian democrats momentarily. The Walloon Christian democrats have survived better, although still with electoral losses and starting from a much smaller basis.
constituency for price stability and the support for the euro remains high among those favored by it. Seniors and other recipients of benefits understand that abandonment of the single currency can only come at the expense of the real value of their claims. Instead, low-skill, younger voters and public sector workers with diminished expectations and who are unlikely to enjoy the generous social benefits when they retire want the "deck of cards" reshuffled.
These voters would benefit from expansionary fiscal policies and a write-off of existing debts.
In the Spanish case of Podemos, the over-representation among its leaders of nurses, teachers, and junior university faculty is noticeable. These public workers, particularly in the lower and middle ranges, view with concern a new "normal" of tight government deficits required to maintain the euro and to service the debt. The pressure of the sudden real adjustment that was required of Greece, Spain, or Portugal is easing. These countries are, after all, market economies and rigid as they may be, their internal prices eventually drop and markets clear. Growth has resumed and unemployment is trending down; housing prices have recovered somewhat. The tension of the early years of the crisis that propelled these new parties to the forefront of political life is no longer there. Thus, a possible euro breakup is not the urgent matter that it was in 2011 and 2012. But the diminished expectations remain, mostly driven by low wages and a reduced capacity to accumulate wealth.
In particular, wages and prices in the non-tradable sector bear the brunt of the adjustment to address the enormous external liabilities accumulated by these countries. These diminished expectations will remain a source of support for the new left parties in the years to come.
It is here that Italy remains in a unique position. The reason is that its external liabilities were never as large as those of Spain and Greece. As a result, the sudden adjustment that was required of these two countries was not required of Italy. And because the Italian adjustment remains to be undertaken, the pressure to abandon the euro in this country remains much more intense (Roth, Jonung, and Nowak-Lehmann, 2016) . Support for the euro in Italy has consistently fallen whereas it has stabilized or even slightly increased in the other Southern European countries. The impeccable logic of the monetary union has reasserted itself, but the fragmentation of the political left is likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future.
The success of extreme-right parties in the north is fueled in large part by the resentment about fiscal transfers to Southern Europe and the possibility of even larger transfers in the future (although opposition to immigration from outside the euro area is also a central factor).
Thus, the weakness of left-wing mainstream parties in the south and the weakness of right-wing mainstream parties in the north are the mirror image of the same phenomenon: the position of each country in the debtor and fiscal transfers within the euro area.
Our hypothesis is not entirely deterministic. It depends on the arrival of a financial crisis, and the concrete form that the change in party systems takes depends on the preconditions of each country and shocks such as the presence of a charismatic new leader. Our theory predicts patterns of behavior (technically, a probability distribution), not a precise accounting of each national experience.
Financial crises are often accompanied by a strong weakening of political legitimacy. This may be due to the obvious redistributive aspects of these crises and the subsequent bailouts In Germany, Alternative for Germany revisits the commitment of the Federal Republic to unlimited European integration around which Konrad Adenauer organized reconstruction.
The euroscepticism of Alternative for Germany links itself with a historical thread of national conservatism in the German-speaking world that never disappeared; it just went underground.
The euro crisis allowed it to resurface.
Finally, the National Front in France is the heir to the forces behind the Vichy regime and, even before that, of Action Française and legitimism. Even if draped with the flag of republican values as a battering ram against emigrants, the National Front embodies all the forces in French life that never fully accepted the revolutionary inheritance from the 19th century.
Conversely, this framework also explains why we do not see successful extreme-right parties in the south of Europe or successful radical-left parties in the north of Europe. The memory of the right-wing dictatorships of the second half of the 20th century is still sufficiently strong to prevent the electoral success of these parties (except in Greece, where the secular animosity against its Middle East neighbors helps to fuel a virulent anti-immigration Gestalt). And radical-left parties have little appeal in countries such as Germany that are large holders of debt. It is hard to rally against "capitalists" when your electorate is composed of bond-holders.
Of course, many other forces are at play in the evolution of the party system. We mentioned in the introduction how the rapid secularization of European societies over the last three decades must have played a role in the sharp negative trend of Christian democratic parties. In the Netherlands, the Christian democrats have gone from dominance to minority and, in Flanders, their hegemony has been destroyed by the New Flemish Alliance, more nationalist, more promarket, and more secular. Christian democrat parties in Germany and Austria face the ghost of a negative electoral trend lurking behind them. It is not a surprise, perhaps, that in Southern Europe, where the new right-wing parties that appeared after the fall of the dictatorships were not openly Christian democrats (New Democracy in Greece or the People's Party in Spain, while including some Christian democratic cadres, were more traditional conservative parties)
have resisted better the caprices of the crisis. Similarly, the disappearance of traditional unions and manufacturing jobs has damaged the fortunes of social democratic parties, which cannot any longer appeal to class solidarity to sell tough economic adjustment programs whose benefits would only be seen in the future. Now, in contrast, we are in a situation where the future of the euro might be in danger because the party systems that created it no longer exist. There is a non-trivial possibility that, sooner or later, one the new radical parties will reach power in a central country of the euro area and that, by design or accident, a major crisis will lead to the collapse of the euro.
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Political parties are endogenous and changing a central piece of economic policy is bound to change them as well.
